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BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a dismissal of a petition for Writ 
of Habeas Corpus in the Third Judicial District Court. This 
Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah Code Ann. 
S 78-2-2(3)(i)(Supp. 1988). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the trial court properly found that 
petitioner's claims were procedurally barred because he could and 
should have raised his claims on direct appeal? 
2. Whether this Court is precluded from considering 
the merits of petitioner's claim because of the lack of record 
support and the lower court's finding of procedural default? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Petitioner was convicted of Aggravated Kidnapping, a 
first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302 
(1978), and Second Degree Murder, a first degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (1978), after a jury trial 
on December 31, 1980, in the Sixth Judicial District Court, in 
and for Sevier County, State of Utah, the Honorable Don V. Tibbsf 
Judge, presiding (R. 52). Petitioner was sentenced on January 
14, 1981, to two concurrent terms of five years to life in the 
Utah State Prison. Ici. On direct appeal, petitioner's trial 
counsel filed an "Anders" brief. (R. 65-75) Petitioner filed a 
separate pro se brief (R. 77-85). This Court affirmed 
petitioner's conviction in State v. Dunn, 646 P.2d 709 (Utah 
1982) (R. 88-89; Addendum "A"). 
On July 10, 1987, petitioner filed a petition for a 
Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Third Judicial District Court, in 
and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Michael R. 
Murphy, Judge, presiding (R. 2-5; Addendum "B"). Upon the 
State's motion and the sworn testimony of petitioner, Judge 
Murphy dismissed the petition because petitioner could and should 
have raised all issues concerning his conviction on direct 
appeal. (R. 143-48; Addendum "CM). Petitioner now appeals that 
dismissal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Petitioner and one Howard Scott were hitchhiking in 
Barstow, California when the victim, Ernest Sprinkle, gave them a 
ride in his motorhome (R. 88). The three men went to Las Vegas 
and then to Mesquite, Nevada. J^ d. In Mesquite, Sprinkle became 
intoxicated and petitioner began driving the motorhome. Id. 
Sometime after leaving Mesquite, Sprinkle was struck on 
the head with a pistol, bound, and placed in the bathroom of the 
motorhome. Jd. In Richfield, Utah, a stop was made at a service 
station to obtain a fuse for the CB radio in the motorhome. Id. 
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While at the service station, Sprinkle gained consciousness and 
began to pound on the rear window of the motorhome with his hands 
still bound, jld. Petitioner and Scott quickly left the service 
station with petitioner driving and Scott in the rear of the 
motorhome to subdue Sprinkle. Id. A service station attendant 
reported his observations to the police. Id. 
A Utah Highway Patrolman, having been alerted by the 
service station attendant's call, observed the motorhome in 
Salina. Id. The officer followed the motorhome for one or two 
miles and stopped the vehicle. Id. Petitioner and Scott were 
arrested. Ld. Sprinkle's body was found in the motorhome, as 
was a .25 caliber pistol. Id. at 88-89. Sprinkle had died as a 
result of two gunshot wounds inflicted by the pistol. Ld. at 89. 
Despite petitioner's defense of duress, the jury 
convicted petitioner of Second Degree Murder and Aggravated 
Kidnapping. Td. at 88-9. On appeal, petitioner's trial counsel 
filed an "Anders" brief and requested to withdraw from the case. 
(R. 65-75, 89). The Anders brief raised four claims of error: 
(1) that the trial court erred in not granting his motion for 
change of venue; (2) that the trial court erred in not 
suppressing evidence of bullets which were found in his 
belongings; (3) that the evidence was insufficient to support the 
jury verdict; and, (4) that the trial court erred in admitting 
into evidence a photograph of the victim's body. Id. 
Petitioner also filed a pro se brief in which he 
claimed: (1) that the police lacked probable cause to arrest 
petitioner; (2) that the police conducted an illegal search and 
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seizure; and, (3) that the evidence was insufficient. (R. 77-85, 
89). This Court affirmed petitioner's conviction and stated that 
"[djefense counsel has complied in every respect with the 
"Anders" requirements . . .- (R. 89; Addendum "A"). State v. 
Dunn, 646 P.2d 709, 711 (Utah 1982). 
On July 10, 1987, petitioner filed a petition for Writ 
of Habeas Corpus in the Third Judicial District Court (R. 2-5). 
In his petition, petitioner raised the following claims: (1) 
that the trial court erred in denying a change of venue; (2) in 
admitting a photograph; (3) in denying petitioner's motion to 
suppress evidence; (4) in admitting into evidence petitioner's 
prior convictions; and, (5) that petitioner's counsel was 
ineffective in failing to make proper objections; (6) in failing 
to appeal issues requested by petitioner; (7) in failing to 
prepare accomplice jury instructions; (8) in failing to obtain 
evidence from a trailer before its removal from the State; (9) in 
stipulating to the admission of photographs; (10) in stipulating 
to the entry of evidence which may have been inadmissable as 
improperly seized or for inadequate chain of custody; (11) in 
filing an Anders brief on appeal; and, (12) that he was denied a 
fair trail due to jury selection errors; (13) juror bias; and, 
(14) juror access to information from a co-defendant's trial (R. 
2-5; Addendum "B"). 
In response, the State moved to dismiss the petition on 
the basis that petitioner's claims were either addressed on 
appeal or could and should have been raised on direct appeal. (R. 
58-63). After a hearing on the motion, and based upon the 
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arguments of the parties and sworn testimony of the petitioner, 
the trial court found that all issues raised by petitioner could 
and should have been raised at the time of appeal (R. 143-48). 
Accordingly, the court denied and dismissed the petition. Id. 
Defendant now appeals that dismissal. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Because petitioner's alleged errors could and should 
have been raised on direct appeal, he cannot raise them for the 
first time in a post-conviction relief action. Alleged 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims should not qualify for 
the -unusual circumstances" exception to waiver doctrine which 
precludes post-conviction relief on issues which could and should 
have been raised on direct appeal. In the present case, 
petitioner filed a separate pro se brief on appeal raising 
several issues. However, he failed to assert the alleged errors 
he raises for the first time in the present post-conviction 
action. Accordingly, the trial court properly concluded that 
petitioner procedurally waived the claims asserted in his 
petition. 
Because the trial court declined to reach the merits of 
petitioner's claims due to procedural default, this Court should 
not consider the unsupported allegations of ineffective 
assistance of counsel beyond a determination whether the trial 
properly found procedural default to exi^t. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT 
PETITIONER COULD AND SHOULD HAVE RAISED ALL 
ISSUES CONCERNING HIS CONVICTION ON DIRECT 
APPEAL. 
Petitioner first asserts that the District court erred 
in summarily dismissing his Habeas Corpus petition as 
procedurally defective. Petitioner's assertion is meritless. 
It is well settled law in Utah that if alleged errors 
could have been raised on direct appeal, this court is "precluded 
under basic principles of appellate review from addressing them 
now." Bundy v. Deland, 94 Utah Adv. Rep. 9, 9 (Sup. Ct. October 
26, 1988) In stating a post-conviction claim, a petitioner must 
allege an "obvious injustice or a substantial and prejudicial 
denial of a constitutional right in the trial of a matter; . . . •' 
id. 
This Court in Codianna v. Morris, 660 P.2d 1101 (Utah 
1983) clearly emphasized the standard for Habeas Corpus review: 
It is therefore well settled in this state 
that allegations of error that could have 
been but were not raised on appeal from a 
criminal conviction cannot be raised by 
habeas corpus or post-conviction review, 
except in unusual circumstances. 
A much-quoted statement of the type of 
errors that are and are not cognizable by 
habeas corpus is the following from this 
Court's unanimous opinion in Brown v. Turner, 
21 Utah 2d 96, 98-99, 440 P.2d 968, 969 
(1968) (Crockett, C.J.): 
[Habeas corpus] is an extraordi-
nary remedy which is properly 
invocable only when the court 
had no jurisdiction over the 
person or the offense, or where 
~fi-
the requirements of law have 
been so disregarded that the 
party is substantially and 
effectively denied due process 
of law, or where some such fact 
is shown that it would be 
unconscionable not to re-examine 
the conviction. If the 
contention of error is something 
which is known or should be 
known to the party at the time 
the judgement was enteredf it 
must be reviewed in the manner 
and within the time permitted by 
regular prescribed procedure, or 
the judgment becomes final and 
is not subject to further 
attack, except in some such 
unusual circumstance as we have 
mentioned above. Were it 
otherwise, the regular rules of 
procedure governing appeals and 
the limitations of time 
specified therein would be 
rendered impotent. 
Codianna v. Morris, 660 P.2d at 1104-05 (bracketed material and 
emphasis in original). The standard review was further detailed 
by this Court in Bundy v. Deland, 94 Utah Adv. Rep. 9 (Sup. Ct. 
Oct. 26, 1988) as follows: 
On appeal from denial of habeas corpus 
relief, "we survey the record in the light 
most favorable to the findings and judgment; 
and we will not reverse if there is a 
reasonable basis therein to support the trial 
court's refusal to be convinced that the writ 
should be granted." 
Id. at 10, quoting Velasguez v. Pratt, 21 Utah 2d 229, 232, 443 
P.2d 1020, 1022 (1968)(citations omitted). In Codianna, this 
Court rejected the argument that ineffective assistance of 
counsel necessarily constitutes "unusual circumstances- that 
would allow petitioner to bypass the regular appellate process in 
favor of Habeas Corpus. The Court statedt 
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To permit the inevitable instances of 
attorney oversight or ignorance to qualify 
for the "unusual circumstances'9 exception 
would allow that exception to swallow up the 
rule, thereby transforming habeas corpus from 
an extraordinary remedy into an alternative 
appeal mechanism in contravention of the 
finality of criminal judgments that is the 
settled policy of this state. 
Codianna, 660 P.2d at 1105. 
Likewise, in Zumbrunnen v. Turner, 27 Utah 2d 428, 497 
P.2d 34 (1972), this Court stated; 
He [Zumbrunnen] pursued this petition, after 
his time for appeal from the conviction had 
expired. He claimed . . . his counsel, who 
assisted him at his request, was incompetent. 
[This point] could have been urged on a 
regular appeal. This court repeatedly has 
said the writ cannot be used as a substitute 
for such appeal. • . 
Id. at 35. 
Similarly, in Matthew v. Cook/ 754 P.2d 666 (Utah 
1988), this Court said that w[p]laintiff did not show cause why 
he failed to follow the route of regular appellate procedure and 
that he suffered prejudice as a result of his default.11 Id. at 
667. 
Analagously, this Court recently held in Andrews v. 
Shulsen, 94 Utah Adv. Rep. 11 (Sup. Ct. October 27, 1988), that a 
petitioner must show Hgood cause" as to why claims raised in a 
Habeas Corpus proceeding, which could or should have been raised 
earlier, were not raised in prior post-conviction proceedings. 
Id. at 12. Without a showing of good cause it is simply an 
"abuse of the writ and requires dismissal of the petition.- Id. 
In Bryant v. Turner, 19 Utah 2d 284, 431 P.2d 121 
(1967), this Court addressed a similar issue. In Bryant, 
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petitioner claimed, -that because of his inability to communicate 
he was not and could not be represented effectively by counsel." 
Id. at 122. The District Court denied the petition and this 
Court affirmed, ^d. 122-3. In discussing the Bryant case, the 
this Court said: 
This proceeding is an attempt to do that 
which should not be done nor countenanced in 
our procedure: to turn habeas corpus into an 
appellate review. That is not its purpose, 
and it is not so intended. The regular steps 
of criminal procedure provided for in our law 
give adequate protections of the rights of 
one accused of crime and safeguards against 
conviction of the innocent. They afford full 
opportunity to present and have determined 
any matters of defense, and to make 
objections to any error or impropriety that 
may affect his rights. Moreover, after 
judgment is entered, there is assured a right 
of appeal within the proper time to seek 
redress for any such error or transgression 
of those rights. When this procedure has 
been followed the judgment should normally be 
final. It should not be subjected to a 
continual merry-go-round of collateral 
attacks upon various and specious pretexts as 
some courts are prone to permit nowadays. In 
our opinion such an inconsiderate attitude 
toward final judgments regularly arrived at 
by courts of competent jurisdiction robs the 
law of the dignity and respect it is entitled 
to. It tends to degrade the whole process of 
law enforcement and the administration of 
justice and thus to undermine the good order 
of society it is purposed to maintain. 
£d. at 122. 
In McRoy v. Warden, Nevada State Prison, 88 Nev. 267, 
496 P.2d 162 (1972), a petitioner was convicted and his attorney 
filed an "Anders" brief. 496 P.2d 1663. Petitioner McRoy then 
filed a petition for post-conviction relief claiming inadequate 
assistance of counsel because, in his opinion, the "Anders" brief 
was inadequate. Id. The District Court denied the petition and 
the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. Lei., at 164. The Nevada 
Supreme Court concluded that because the petitioner had ample 
opportunity to raises issues pro se on direct appeal, his habeas 
corpus appeal was frivolous. Id. 
In a case directly on point, this Court invoked the 
doctrine of waiver or procedural default in affirming the summary 
dismissal of a petition claiming ineffective counsel. In Hafen 
v. Morris, 632 P.2d 875 (Utah 1981), the defendant was convicted 
and sentenced to prison. Jd., at 876. The defendant appealed 
and his conviction was affirmed. Id. He then sought Habeas 
Review and claimed that his trial attorney "failed to honor his 
request to challenge a juror who appellant knew. [He] also 
claimed that his trial attorney failed to raise that issue on 
appeal although appellant had so requested." Ld., at 876. 
Naturally, in his post-conviction action he claimed "he was 
denied effective assistance of counsel. • . " Ri. The lower 
court: 
dismissed his petition on the ground that he 
had waived any right to raise the issue of 
the failure of his attorney to challenge the 
juror. The court determined that it would 
not grant an evidentiary hearing on that 
issue since it could have been raised at 
appellant's trial or on appeal. • . • 
Id. The Supreme Court upheld the lower court and stated: 
We explained further, in Brown v. Turner, 21 
Utah 2d 96, 440 P.2d 968 (1968), that "If the 
contention of error is something which is 
known or should be known to the party at the 
time the judgment was entered, it must be 
reviewed in the manner and within the time 
permitted by regular prescribed procedure, or 
the judgment becomes final and is not subject 
to further attack, except in some such 
unusual circumstances as we have mentioned 
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above. Were it otherwise, the regular rules 
of procedure governing appeals and the 
limitations of time specified therein would 
be rendered impotent." 
Waiver was found in Schad v. Turnerf 
supra, where the petitioner in a petition for 
habeas corpus attempted to raise as an issue 
that the District Attorney had exceeded the 
bounds of propriety in his cross-examination 
of the petitioner at the trial. We there 
observed that since that was an issue which 
could have been raised on the petitioner's 
former appeal of his case to this Court, we 
would not take cognizance of it on a later 
petition for habeas corpus. 
If the appellant's counsel did in fact fail 
to honor his request to challenge the juror, 
the appellant had the adequate opportunity at 
the trial to have made complaint to the 
court. Furthermore, following his conviction 
that issue could have been raised by him in 
this Court in his appeal which pended in this 
Court for many months. In view of his 
silence, the trial judge correctly ruled that 
he had waived any claim of error in this 
regard. There are not here any of the 
"unusual circumstances" referred to in Bryant 
v. Turner, supra. 
Id. Thus, this Court held that Hafen waived review of his 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim because he failed to 
raise the issue at trial or while his direct appeal was pending. 
In the instant case, petitioner's trial counsel filed 
an Anders brief raising four issues on direct appeal. (R. 65-75, 
89) Additionally, petitioner filed a separate pro se brief 
raising three issues. (R. 77-85, 89). Petitioner did not raise 
an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Jd. This Court 
affirmed petitioner's conviction stating that M[d]efense counsel 
has complied in every respect with the "Anders" requirements . . 
." (R. 87-89; Addendum HA M). State v. Dunn, 646 P.2d 709, 711 
(Utah 1982). 
n_ 
Approximately five years later, petitioner filed a 
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus raising fourteen claims of 
error including ineffective assistance of trial and appellate 
counsel. (R. 2-5; Addendum "B"). After a hearing on the State's 
Motion to dismiss, and based upon the arguments of the parties 
and sworn testimony of petitioner, the trial court found that all 
issues raised by petitioner could and should have been raised on 
direct appeal (R. 143-48; Addendum MC M). 
The present case is indistinguishable from Hafen. In 
fact, petitioner in the present case was not merely silent as was 
Hafeny but filed a separate pro se brief on direct appeal raising 
three claims of error. Noticeably absent from petitioner's brief 
is any claim of ineffective assistance of trial or appellate 
counsel. Thus, the present case represents a more compelling 
basis for waiver than was the case in Hafen. Petitioner was not 
merely silent, but affirmatively raised issues pro se on direct 
appeal beyond those raised in the brief filed by petitioner's 
counsel. Under Hafen, petitioner cannot now attempt to use the 
remedy of post-conviction relief as a secondary appellate 
process. 
Petitioner cites several cases in support of his claim 
that waiver does not apply if a petitioner claims ineffective 
counsel and was represented by the same counsel at trial and on 
direct appeal. Brief of Appellant at p. 18. Wiley v. State, 517 
So. 2d 1373, 1378 (Miss. 1987); Bear v. State, 417 N.W. 2d 467, 
472 (Iowa App. 1987); People v. Fordy 99 111. App. 3d 973, 55 
111.Dec. 365, 426 N.E.2d 340, 343 (1981); State v. Hunt, 26 
Md.App. 417, 338 A.2d 95, 100 (1975). However, these cases are 
distinguishable by the fact that none of the petitioners in the 
above cited cases filed a separate pro se fcrief on direct appeal 
raising additional grounds for review. In any event, this Court 
in Hafen held that even where petitioner is represented by the 
same counsel at trial and on direct appeal, silence is waiver. 
Hafen 632 P.2d at 876. 
Petitioner further asserts that because he is a lay 
person, he could not be reasonably expected to recognize and 
raise the ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Brief of 
Appellant at p. 21. In support, petitioner cites State v. Hunt, 
26 Md.App. 417, 338 A.2d 95, 97 (1975). 
Hunt is distinguishable where the lower court found 
that a conflict of interest existed between Hunt and six co-
defendants who were all represented by the same attorney. Id. 
Because the conflict of interest was considered a "special 
circumstance*1 justifying an exception to the waiver rule, Hunt 
was allowed to raise issues for the first time in a post-
conviction action. Id. 
In the instant case, petitioner has not shown an 
•'unusual circumstance," nor did the lower court find one. The 
assertion of ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on 
appeal does not constitute Many of the unusual circumstances 
referred to in Bryant v. Turner, supra." Hafen 632 P.2d at 876. 
In the absence of "unusual circumstances," petitioner's claims 
are deemed waived. 
Increasingly, criminal defendants are filing post-
conviction actions claiming ineffective assistance of trial and 
appellate counsel as grounds for relief. As discussed earlier, 
this Court has repeatedly expressed that post-conviction actions 
cannot be used as an Malternative appeal mechanism." Codianna, 
660 P.2d at 1105. To allow an ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim "to qualify for the unusual circumstances exception would 
allow that exception to swallow the rule." J^ d. A post-
conviction petitioner would merely need to assert that a latent 
discovered error occurred and that his attorney must have been 
ineffective for failing to raise it earlier. Thus, any issue not 
raised on direct appeal could be addressed in post-conviction 
action by merely claiming attorney oversight. The result is a 
secondary appellate process before a single trial judge which 
effectively puts the original trial on trial. A further result 
is a duplicated judicial process which creates a substantial 
burden on the court system and contravenes "the finaliity of 
criminal judgments that is the settled policy of this state." 
Codianna, 660 P.2d at 1105. For these reasons, a strict waiver 
rule must be applied in post-conviction actions and the remedy of 
Habeas Corpus must be preserved for those instances which are 
truly extraordinary. 
POINT II 
BECAUSE PETITIONER'S CLAIMS ARE UNSUPPORTED 
BY THE RECORD, THIS COURT MUST PRESUME 
REGULARITY IN THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW. 
Petitioner claims ineffective assistance of counsel at 
trial and on appeal. In support of his claim, he engages in 
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extensive argument based upon facts contained in the original 
criminal trial record. However, the record on appeal, as 
certified by the Third District Court Clerk, does not contain the 
original criminal trial record. (R. 1) Instead, the appellate 
record consists of two volumes, the habeas court record 
containing the filings of the parties and a transcript of a 
hearing held August 3, 1987. 
In reviewing a lower Court's ruling, this Court has 
consistently held that M[t]he burden of showing error is on the 
party who seeks to upset the judgment. In the absence of record 
evidence to the contrary, we assume regularity in the proceedings 
below, and affirm the judgment." State v. Jones, 657 P.2d 1263, 
1267 (Utah 1982). "This Court simply cannot rule on a question 
which depends for its existence upon alleged facts unsupported by 
the record. State v. Wulffenstein, 657 P.2d 289, 293 (Utah 1983) 
cert, denied 460 U.S. 1044 (1983); see also State v. Steqqell, 
660 P.2d 252, 253 (Utah 1983). A petitioner "may not prevail on 
ineffectiveness claims where he has only raised the possibility 
of ineffective assistance of counsel but failed to offer evidence 
thereon." State v. Colonna, No. 870136, slip op. at 10 (Utah 
Sup. Ct. December 13, 1988). 
In the trial court below, the judge ruled as follows: 
Based on review of the brief filed on 
behalf of the respondent and all of 
petitioner's [sic] submissions and the sworn 
testimony of petitioner, the court finds that 
all issues raised could have or should have 
been raised at the time of appeal and for 
that reason the petition for Writ of Habeas 
Corpus is denied. 
15-
(R. 143)(Emphasis Added). On appeal from a denial of habeas 
corpus relief, this Court must "survey the record in the light 
most favorable to the findings and judgment; and [this Court] 
will not reverse if there is a reasonable basis therein to 
support the trial court's refusal to be convinced that the writ 
should be granted.- Velasquez v. Pratt, 21 Utah 2d 229, 232, 443 
P.2d 1020, 1022 (1968)(citations omitted). Where the trial court 
refused to reach the merits of the petition due to procedural 
default, this Court should not consider the unsupported 
allegations contained in the petition beyond a determination 
whether the trial court properly found procedural default to 
exist. Therefore, this Court should decline petitioner's 
invitation to consider the merits of his ineffective assistance 
claims. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing arguments, respondent 
respectfully requests this court to affirm the lower court's 
dismissal of the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. 
ffthr 
DATED this if day of December, 1988. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
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ADDENDUM A 
CTfcTE «• OUKK UuK TOft 
it determined that there was an industry 
•I accident, there k no limitation as to 
the timt during which the medicals must 
continue to be furnished. [Emphasis add-
ad, footnote omitted.]1 
In the recent caae of Christensen v. In* 
dustris! Commits/on,1 the iasue was again 
presented as to whether the term "compen-
sation," within the meaning of the Work-
men's Compensation Act, includes payments 
for medical expenses. We again concluded 
that it did not, and reaffirmed our decision 
in Kenneeott Copper. 
[2] In support of their remaining con-
tention that the Commission was without 
jurisdiction to make an award, plaintiffs 
cite portions of U.C.A., 1953, 85-1*99 and 
85-1-100, which read respectively as fol-
lows: 
If no claim for compensation b filed with 
the industrial commission within three 
years from the date of the Occident or the 
dsteofthe last psyment of compensation, 
the right to compensation shall be wholly 
barred 
Whenever an employee sustains an ac-
cident arising out of or in the course of 
bis employment it shall be mandatory 
that the employee tile with the commis-
sion in writing notice of such accident 
with a copy to the employer; if such 
notice is so filed within three years of the 
time of the accident the Commission shall 
obtain jurisdiction to mike its award 
when the injury becomes apparent [Em-
phasis added] 
[3] Notwithstanding the fact that the 
foregoing statutes require either the filing 
of a claim for compensation or the filing of 
a written notice of the accident in order to 
invoke the jurisdiction of the Commission, 
this Court has long recognised that a claim 
for compensation need not bear any partic-
ular formality.9 In fact, -great liberality as 
to form and substance of an application for 
compensation is to be indulged."9 How* 
4 1**877. 
I Ulah. 842 l»Jd 753 (1882) 
ever informal the daim may be, it need 
only give "notice to the parties and to the 
commission of the material facts on which 
the right asserted is to depend and against 
whom claim is made.**1 
In the instant case, the content of the 
several documents filed with the Commis-
sion reveal that all interested parties, the 
employer Wholesale Cleaners, the insurer 
State Insurance Fund, and the Commission 
were on notice of Dutson's claim and were 
duly apprised of the materia), jurisdictional 
facts upon which the claim was based 
Further, the documents filed confirm that: 
1) Wholesale Cleaners and State Insurance 
Fund recognized liability; 2) compensation 
and medical benefits were paid, and 3) 
payments of compensation and medical ben-
efits would continue. We therefore con-
clude that the form and substance of the 
documents filed with the Commission were 
adequate within the meaning, purpose and 
intent of the statutes, sup/% to confer juris-
diction upon the Commission. 
Affirmed. 
STEWART, OAKS, 
HAM. JJ., concur. 
HOWE and DUR-
Sir iptoaif isn't • vis} 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and 
Respondent. 
Robert W. DUNN, Defendant 
and Appellant 
No. 17571. 
Supreme Court of Uuh. 
MayS. 1982. 
Following conviction by the Sixth Dis-
trict Court, Sevier County, Don V. Tibbs, J., 
7. HUt ¥. todustrisl Gomim$sioa> 79 Uuh 47. 7 
tM 2*4 (1822). 
8. Aetns Uh huursnet Co r. Industrial Com-
8. Uuh Apes Mining Co r. todustrisl Commis- mission. 88 Utah 235. 941 * 223 (1825) 
Stan. Ill Utah 905, 909 fM 571 (IMS) 
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7 1 0 ft*11 *** PACIFIC REPORTER, Id SERIES 
of affrtvatad kidnapping and eecond-de-
gree murder, defendant filed timely notice 
of appeal. Defense counsel tiled Andtn 
brief seeking to withdraw. The Supreme 
Court held that defense counsel's request to 
withdraw would be granted. 
Ordered accordingly. 
8tewart» J., concurred bi result 
Criminal Lew »»lt77J 
Defense counsel's request to withdraw 
was granted where defense counsel had 
complied in every respect with Andtn re-
quirements by filing brief referring to pos-
sible arguments and certifying that he had 
furnished copy of brief to defendant and 
points raised by defendant were without 
Marcus Taylor, Labium k Taylor, Rich-
field, for defendant and appellant 
David L Wilkinson, Atty. Gen., Salt Lake 
Gty, for plaintiff and respondent 
PER CURIAM: 
Following his conviction of aggravated 
kidnapping1 and second degree murder,1 
defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. 
Defense counsel has filed an *Andtrf 
brief,1 seeking now to withdraw. 
Tbe facts leading up to defendant's con-
viction, briefly stated, are as follow*. De-
fendant and one Howard Scott were hitch-
biking in Bantow, California, when they 
obtained a ride in a motorhome driven by 
Ernest Sprinkle. Together, they proceeded 
In the motorhome to Las Vegas and then to 
Meaquite, Nevada. In Meaquite, Mr. Sprin-
kle apparently became aomewhat intoxicat-
ed, and the trio left with defendant driving 
the motorhome. Sometime after leaving 
Meaquite, Sprinkle was struck on tbe bead 
L VJCJL. 1153. H4-J02. 
t. A ttseer Indudtd offense of murder In tbe 
first dttrtt—Q* offense with which defendant 
was chars** under U.CA.. 1153, 7*4-102. 
I Anders v. GsMonUa. *SS VS. m . •? I.CL 
ISOS, IS LMAM S53 (1SS7). 
with a pistol, bound, and placed in the bath-
room at the rear of the motorhome. There 
is considerable dispute as to bow this oc-
curred. The prosecution contended that de-
fendant and Scott acted together in aasaulu 
ing Sprinkle and that the pistol was defend-
ant's. Defendant contends that Scott spon-
taneously assaulted and bound Sprinkle and 
that the pistol was produced by Scott De-
fendant claims that he was fearful for his 
own aafety and that he was an innocent 
participant in the assault and in the events 
that followed. 
As the journey continued, stops were 
made for the purpose of purchasing gaso-
line. Then in Richfield, Utah, a stop was 
made at a service station in order to pur-
chase a fuse for a CB radio in the motor-
borne. At this point, Sprinkle apparently 
gained consciousness and, with his hands 
atill bound, began to pound on tbe rear 
window of the motorhome. Defendant and 
Scott quickly got in the motorhome and left 
the station, the former doing the driving 
while the latter went to the rear to again 
subdue Sprinkle. Much of this was ob-
served by the station attendant, who re-
ported his observations to the police. 
As the motorhome left Richfield and pro-
ceeded some 20 miles to Salina, it was fol-
lowed by a semi-tractor trailer. The driver 
of that vehicle observed a man through the 
rear window of the motorhome, who was 
apparently calling to him and waiving for 
some unknown reason.4 Thereafter, tbe 
blind was pulled down so as to completely 
cover the window. 
Having been alerted by the call from the 
service station attendant, a Utah Highway 
Patrolman observed the motorhome in Sali-
aa After following H for one or two miles, 
the patrolman stopped the vehicle and sub-
sequently arrested both Scott and defend-
ant Sprinkle's body was found in the mo-
4. Tbe witness stated that be was not oriuty 
alarmed at such activity, hsvtns concluded thst 
some sort of Sunken party was occuntas to 
tbe motorhome. 
BAWDEN AND ASSOCIATES v. SMITH 
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torhoae, as was a M caliber pistol. TesU 
indicated that Sprinkle had died as the re-
sult of two gunshot wounds inflicted by the 
weapon, and that Scott had fired i t 
At trial, Scott testified that he and de-
fendant had become alarmed at Sprinkle's 
activity at the Richfield service station and 
that defendant had suggested and encour-
aged the shooting of Sprinkle. As indicated 
supra, defendant claimed that he was an 
unwilling participant in the crime and that 
he was greatly relieved when stopped by 
the patrolman. Nevertheless, the jury con-
victed defendant and he was sentenced by 
the court to two concurrent prison terms of 
five yean to life 
la his request to withdraw, defense coun-
sel represents that he has carefully re-
searched the record and the law and that he 
is unable to find any arguable issues on 
appeal. He indicates that he has communi-
cated with defendant on numerous occa-
sions regarding the appeal, the substance 
and effect of which are stated as follows: 
The defendant has consistently communi-
cated to me that he is of the opinion [1] 
that the trial court erred in not granting 
his motion for change of venue, and [2] 
that the trial court erred in not suppress-
ing evidence of bullets which were found 
in his belongings. Some months ago, the 
defendant communicated to me (3) that 
he felt the evidence was insufficient to 
support the verdict of the jury and [4] 
that the trial court erred in admitting 
into evidence a photograph of the body of 
the victim. In my most raoent meeting 
with Mr. Dunn, which occurred at the 
Utah Bute Prison on January IS, 1982,1 
•gtin reviewed with him all points which 
he wished to raise on the appeal. At that 
MttiQg, he limited himself to the claims 
thst venue should have been changed and 
that evidence of the bullets should have 
keen suppressed. (Numbering added.] 
b the brief prepared by counsel in eon-
JtKtioa with his request to withdraw, he 
its stated the four contentions raised by 
defendant (as numbered above). Under 
*ch point, counsel has cited relevant au-
tb*Hy. as well as the reoord itself, which 
••Is whh the contentions of error. 
Defense counsel has complied in every 
respect with the "AndenT requiremenu as 
recently explained in Sute v. Cl*yton% 
Utah, 639 ?2A 168 (1961). Counsel has 
filed a brief which refers to possible argu-
ments, and he has eertified that he has 
furnished a copy of the brief to defendant 
On February 19, 1982, defendant also 
filed a brief wherein he basically asserts a 
lack of probable cause for his arrest, illegal 
search and seizure, and insufficiency of the 
evidence. Having reviewed the record and 
the law, we are convinced that these points, 
as well as those addressed by counsel, are 
without merit 
We therefore grant defense counsel's re-
quest to withdraw and affirm defendant's 
conviction. 
STEWART, J., concurs in the result 
^ 
UTftufttftfTVUi 
BALDEN AND ASSOCIATES and Dean 
Bawden, Plaintiff, and Respondents, 
v. 
AMn R. SMITH and Sandra Smith. 
Defendants and Appellant*. 
No. 17681 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
May 5. 1962. 
Appeal wat taken from order of the 
Third District Court, Salt Lake County, 
James S. Sewaya, J , denying motion to 
vacate sheriffs sale and set aside deficiency 
Judgment The Supreme Court, Durham. 
J„ held that: (1) in esse in which two 
mortgages were foreclosed in the same suit, 
finding that one parcel was offered and sold 
separately as required by rule was sup-
ported by competent evidence; (D whm 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT 
STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo JUDGE MICHAEL R. IfiUK ^ n ; 
PETITION FOR A WRIT 
OF HABEAS CORPUS 
Case NO. eiz-_mf. 
ROBERT W. DUNN 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
GERALD L. COOK, Warden of 
the Utah State Prison, State 
of Utah, Department of 
Corrections, 
Respondent. 
oooOooo 
COKES NOW the Petitioner, Robert W. Dunn, and for cause of 
action alleges as follows: 
1. That on or about the 14th day of January 1981 Petitioner 
was sentenced by the Honorable flo^ yr T^ /Vftjj # Judge of the 
Sixth Judicial District, in and for Sevier County, State of Utar*, 
in a criminal complaint which had charged Petitioner with 2nd 
degree murder and aggravated kidnaping in Case No. 789. 
2. That Petitioner was sentenced to a term of 5 to life at 
the Utah State Prison. 
3. That Petitioner is currently located at the Utah State 
Prison. 
1 
4. That Petitioner is currently restrained from the aue 
exercise of his life and liberty by his placement at the Utan 
State Prison for the following reasons: 
(a) Judicial error, in the trral court failure to <1> grant 
Petitioner's motion for change of venue, (2) grant Petitioner's 
motion for exclusion of photograph number 2, <3; grant 
Petitioner's motion to suppress evidence and (4) grant 
Petitioner's motion to prevent testimony regarding prior 
conviction. 
(b) That Petitioner haa ineffective assistance of counsel 
in that trial counsel failed to: <1> make proper objections 
during trial, (2) failure to appeal the issues requestec b> 
Petitioner, (3) failure to prepare accomplice jury instructions, 
ana (4) failure to obtain evidence from the trailer before its 
removal from the state. 
<c) That Petitioner had ineffective assistance of 
counsel for the additional reasons that: (1) Counsel stipulates 
to the entry of photos, <2) Counsel stipulated to the entry of 
evidence that may have been barred by improper search or chain of 
evidence rules, (3) Counsel did not adequately argue the issues 
on appeal but filed only an Anders brief. 
(d) That Petitioner was denied a fair trial in that: (1) 
There were jury selection errors, (2) Certain jurors had previous 
knowledge of the case, and (3) Jurors had access to information 
2 
nof onn 
from Co-Defendanta trial. 
HI, KB " rial I e t i t i o n a i w a s d e n i a l a t a n t i i nl i n t h o t t h e 
P i o b c • i i i i i i i 1 v mi» i i«f H ( I iii | i i c i: r e c o r e n o i 
wi t i i a t a n a m g n j u d g e a p i i u i o i a e i m a t rie m i a o s< :::», 
"5. 1 h o t on A n d e r s n n e f wns [»i in^mi eu t * y t i in c o u n s e l 
i n C a s e N u m b e r ' " ' i a I l e q i nq i I i t, r m o I e i n i i m n at- > m g 
De f e n d a n t s m o 1 1 o n f o i c h a n g e o f v e n \ i e • ( 2 > 11 I a j € ; i n 
o o ! « i t t i n g i n t o e v i d e n c e o p h o t o g r a p h o f t h e b o a y o f t h e V i w ' ^ i i . , 
(3> t r i a l c o u r t e r r o r i n n o t e u p i e a s i n g e v i d e n c e o f b u l l e t s 
r e m o v e d £ r o m Def endant""" a p e i a o n o I b a j o n g I n g s a n d I a c k c f e v i d e n c e 
s i ii £ i :i ci: :i e r 11 t c a i ;i j: • p o i t: t 1 i e v e i d :i c t 
'- a1 ' h e n\ pmn
 t wof, d e n i e d b y t h e U t a h S u p r e m e C o u r t . 
I l n i iri« o t IBI i s & J e s o i n a v e j r i - w i o u s 1 y b e e n d e c : d e c 
Ih | i i n i i 'i i '|i i r Ih f i i t i i . 
8 . T h a t U if. Wi i t o f H a b e a s C o r p u s s e e k s r e a r e a s on t h e 
s p e c i f i c n f l t t e i s m e n t i o n e d o o n v e . 
• H f KI I- i Ft F , i IM I I i if« i I i ni i"i i i "i i «i i>ui t 2 
1. Hold oi i«\'identuary hearinq o i< ii h time evidence moy 
De offered concern J nq f he A I le iat I O H A j i t M n comj. Jnini , 
2. PHI M i i ; H J I i(jrn« n ih i iw i n i ne j 11 iigei ' , I L [. i: oceeci 
yithout prepayment o1 coats, lees,, or of hei aaaeasmenta. 
3 
3 • Grant pet it ioner t h© author i ty t o obt a in subpoenas 
Forma Pauper it foi witnesses* ond documents necessary to assist 
i i ! 1I" I  11 I li iii in i « > ) i B IE-toted 
above. 
4 . Issue a W i: j t o I H a b e a s C o r p u s t o h a v e 11 i e p e 1111 c ri e i 
brouaht before it, tc: • t 1 ,e ei ia t if i a t 1: e m a) i: e a ;:i s c ; :iai ge• :: ::£rom t n e 
illegal and uncona 111. u t :i o i i a 1 c onfinenent and restraint, 
DATED
 t h l s J£J£_ day of l^<^yy0^r: .»« 1 9 S _ 2 L -
w^^y^f^ 
CERTIFICATE OF MAIL ING 
1 hereby certify that 1 n .a i led a t i ue and con ect copy cf 
11 i e f o i ci g c :i n g P e t: :i t :i c i i f c ::i: I ? i :i t: ::  f I I a I: B a s C o i p " i s ,„. p o c:: a g e 
prepaid
 p to The UtaJ \ Attor ney General s Office» 236 State Cap.it.oi 
Building, Salt Lake Cit y , UtaJ i 84114, this /__ QOy ol 
—^r- .986, 
.^^-^r^±?-
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FILED »N CLERKS o w c e . 
Salt Lake County Utah 
DAVID L. WILKINSON (14 7;) 
Attorney General 
KIMBERLY K. HORNAK (4341) 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 538-1021 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT W. DUNN, : FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Petitioner 
Case No. C87-4664 
GERALD COOK, Wardt \, Ji idge Mi ch aej R Mi irphy 
Utah State Prison, 
Respondent, : 
The • above-entitled matter was heard JI: \ t .1: ie 281 1 ; 3c ; :>£ 
December
 f 119 8?, before Honorable Michael R. Murphy. 
i: ! *as i resei it \ -presented himself. Respondent 
appeared through counsel, Kimberly iornak, Assistant Attorney 
General. 
c?ument a 11d In av i ng taken the 
matter under advisement now makes and enters its;. 
EIMDIMSS_Qf_£ACI 
1 . The CM mi I f I I I I IH l Ihhfiil |n jt If inner has ir . f l isfr l two 
issues in ,his post-conviction writ of habeas corpus: 1) whether 
i >M i'eeei«>- ineffective assistance of counsel at trial aru en 
appeal, and WII»'(IM-I UM« M^ie. tion
 Wi w«c ^ury was unfair and 
prejudicial. 
2. The Court finds that petitioner's attorney file- in 
Anders brief in +h appealing petitioner 
conviction. The Court additionally finds that |jt . i i nt led 
his ott n the Utah Supreme Court appealing his 
conviction. 
ids that the two issues raised I» 
petitioner < M »rv» . MI un wr • • ineffective assistance of 
- „r se; i improper jury select! aised on 
either petitione brief 
t . * 
rr e C •. . - finds that peti t, luot-1 <I*tJ « uh i £-.!«• issue 
or may have been prejudiced. Ihe 
Court finds ;,.*. rmiri had to review the 
transcript of petitioner1 * considering 
that if nad appeared .:* eie ion 
procedure, the Court could have r, tuois jua 
QQCI4 
DAVID L. WILKINSON (3472) 
Attorney General 
KIMBERLY K. HORNAK (4341) 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 538-1021 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OP SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT W f!ik?Mf . ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
Petitioner : 
-v- : Case No. C87-4664 
GERALD COOK, Warden, : Ji idge Mix x n. Murphy 
Utah State Prison, 
Respondent. 
The above-entitled action was heard oi i December 28, 
i ni it«f , re the Honorable Michael R. Murphy, Third District Court 
Judge, respondent u i , \ dismiss. Petitioner was present 
and represented himself. Respondent appeare 
Assistant Attorney General. 
The Court *dered i* »•< petition and motion to 
dismiss, and having heard argument finds that pet 
a --i.il h i M 1 !>' »* raised all issues raised post-conviction 
writ of habeas corpus on dir^iM. appeal 
••i «,., c> *,..* f » t y *—»'*•« 
lA'i I 'j 1933 
Otputy Clork 
001.14 
IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Motion to Dismiss 
be g r a n t e d f IFIIIII I I I I M pi- I il l i in I m Wr III nil l l r fh r i i f i Cn ipuH In1 
dismissed without prejudice. 
DATED this J_j day u January, 1988. 
fl~LJ. /? 
Honorable Michael R. Ml 
Third District Court Judqr 
ATTF6T 
H.Dt tCt iv . : :^^ 
£SBXlZlQhXZ-Q£-tM>lhlBQ 
IV 
I hereby c e r t i f y that a true and accurate copy o f ( the 
£ di i. .j . i in.| ii V, u A ', III.UW>II postage prepaid, to Robert Dunn, Box 
250, Draper Utah 84020, t h i s _ / . day January, ll>88. 
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